A Legal Term for Punishment

Legal punishment presupposes the crime as the one for which the punishment is imposed and the criminal law as what defines the crime as a crime; A criminal law system presupposes a State that has the political authority to enact and enforce the law and impose sanctions. A normative representation of the legal sanction and its justification must therefore at least presuppose and perhaps explain a normative representation of criminal law (why should we have criminal law?) and the actual powers and functions of the state (by what authority or law does the state promulgate and declare, and impose sanctions on those who violate it?). (See Duff General 2018: Ch. 1.) Crimes are at least a socially forbidden injustice – types of behavior that are condemned as evil by a supposedly authoritative social norm. That is to say, it is an injustice, which is not only “private” matters that in fact affect only those directly involved in it: the community as a whole – in this case, the political community that speaks by law – claims the right to declare that it is wrong. But crime is a “public” injustice in a sense that goes beyond that. Tort law, for example, deals in part with injustice, which is not private in the sense that it is legally and socially declared injustice — for example, the injustice constituted by defamation. But they are still treated as a “private” injustice in the sense that it is up to the aggrieved person to seek redress. He must decide whether or not to bring a civil action against the person who harmed him; And while she can invoke the law to protect her rights, the case is still between her and the accused. On the other hand, a criminal trial pits the entire political community – the State or the people – against the accused: injustice is “public” in the sense that it is an injustice for which the perpetrator must answer not only to the individual victim, but to the entire community through its criminal courts.

Until the nineteenth century, corporal punishment in England could consist of flogging, marking or cutting off a part of the body. The nose, ears, hands, fingers, toes and feet were all removed for criminal activity. Often, the cut part of the body was the part that was blamed for the act. For example, a pickpocket may have a hand cut off and a spy may lose an ear, tongue or eye. Corporal punishment may be imposed in addition to other penalties such as banishment, forced labour or short-term imprisonment. A claim for which no specific value has been determined. On the other hand, we might think that the abomination of a crime or the existence of a fair judicial process is not enough. We also need a relational account of why the international legal community – not this or that national legal entity – has the right to hold perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity to account: that is, why perpetrators are accountable to the international community (see Duff 2010). For claims to be legitimate, they must be based on a common normative community that includes both the perpetrators themselves and those on whose behalf the international legal community brings the perpetrators to justice. (For further discussion of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes, see W. Lee 2010; Wellman, 2011; Giudice and Schaeffer 2012; Davidovic 2015.) The second line of objection to communicative versions of retaliationism – and even retaliationism in general – accuses the notions of desert and guilt at the heart of retaliatory narratives of being misplaced and harmful. One version of this objection is based on skepticism about free will.

Skepticism of free will asserts that people`s behavior is the product of determinism, luck, or chance, and that, therefore, we are not morally responsible for our behavior in the sense that it would justify the idea that those who commit crimes are guilty and deserve punishment (see Pereboom 2013; Caruso, 2018). In response, proponents of retaliation may point out that only if punishment is justified in the desert can we give more than contingent assurances against the punishment of the innocent or the disproportionate punishment of the guilty or assurances against the treatment of the punished as a mere means of achieving desirable social goals (see p. 3 above; but see Vilhauer 2013). To achieve their social purpose, punishments must be exemplary or capable of intimidating those who might be tempted to imitate the guilty; correctional institution or those intended to improve the condition of the convicted person; personal relationships or those that are intended at least to injure the feelings or affect the rights of the guilty person`s relationships, that are divisible or can be classified and proportionate to the crime, as well as the circumstances of the individual case; because of the fallibility of human justice. Another important question is how international institutions should attribute responsibility for crimes such as genocide committed by groups rather than individuals acting alone. (Such questions also arise in the domestic political context, as far as business is concerned, but the scale of crimes such as genocide makes the issues particularly poignant at the international level.) The Nuremberg Tribunal formulated what has since become the authoritative view in international criminal law: “Crimes against international law are committed by individuals, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing persons who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be applied” (International Military Tribunal, 1947). However, several scientists have suggested in recent years that it may sometimes be better to persecute and punish the entire group as a group, rather than focusing solely on prosecuting and punishing members of groups responsible for mass atrocities. One of the concerns of such proposals is that, because punishment typically involves the imposition of burdens, punishing an entire group risks imposing punitive burdens on innocent members of the group: those who were not involved in the crime or perhaps even worked against it or were among its victims. In response to this concern, proponents of the idea of collective punishment have suggested that it does not need to be distributed among group members (see Erskine 2011; Pasternak 2011; Tanguagy-Renaud 2013; but see Hoskins 2014b), or that the benefits of such punishment may be valuable enough to outweigh concerns about harm to innocent people (see Lang 2007:255). The American colonies adopted and cultivated the traditional punishments of England. The most common punishments were corporal punishment and death sentences. Petty criminals were often sentenced to a combination of corporal punishment and several months` imprisonment in prison.

The punishment for more serious crimes was usually death. A consequentialist must justify punishment (if it justifies it) as a cost-effective means for certain independently identifiable goods (for two simple examples of such theories, see Wilson 1983; Walker, 1991). Whatever the report on the final good or goods that each action ultimately targets, the most plausible immediate good that a punishment system can bring is the reduction of crime. A rational and consequentialist legal system is defined as criminal conduct that is harmful in one way or another; By reducing crime, we will therefore reduce the damage caused by crime. It is generally suggested that punishment can help reduce crime by deterring, rendering disabled, or reforming potential offenders (although for an argument that disability is not a true punishment goal, see Hoskins 2016: 260). (There are, of course, other goods that a punishment system can bring. It can assure those who fear crime that the state is taking steps to protect them – although it is a good that can only be achieved in a well-informed society if the most immediate preventive goods are affected. It can also bring satisfaction to those who want to see the evildoers suffer – although to show that to be a true good, and not just a way to avoid justice and private revenge, we should show that it involves more than just revenge, which would mean understanding a version of retaliation.) Although the analysis of the “hybrid theory” of punishment has tended to focus on Hart`s version, one could support hybrid views that are significantly different from Hart`s. For example, while Hart advocated a consequentialist justification of punishment and non-consequentialist constraints, one could instead support a retributivist logic limited by consequentialist considerations (punishment should not tend to exacerbate the crime or undermine offender reform, etc.) or by non-consequentialist (but not retributivist) considerations such as human rights or respect. is reserved for people. Alternatively, one could support a report in which both consequentialist and retaliatory considerations serve as justifications for various branches of law: for this reason, the legislator determines crimes and establishes punishment frameworks with the aim of reducing crime, but the judiciary makes sentencing decisions on the basis of considerations of desert retaliation (M.C.

Altman 2021; Rawls` report (1955) has also been characterized as a hybrid view of this kind, but in reality it is a version of the utilitarianism of rules; for the variety of hybrid views, see Hoskins 2021). When sentencing drug-related offences, most laws distinguish between distribution and possession. State and federal laws generally punish the sale or distribution of drugs more severely than possession. Repeat offenders may be detained on a short-term basis, but long prison sentences are generally reserved for illicit drug suppliers. Parliament may vary the penalty within the same offence for different forms of the same drug.